About the course
Normal-form games: payoff matrix, dominance and iterated elimination, Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, Pareto optimality, the prisoner's dilemma and other classic games. Mixed strategies and the indifference principle. Zero-sum games: maximin and minimax, saddle point, mixed solutions of 2×2 and 2×n games. Extensive-form games: game tree, backward induction, subgame perfect equilibrium, Cournot and Stackelberg duopolies. Repeated games: finite repetition, discounting, trigger strategy. Cooperative games: characteristic function, Shapley value, core. First-price and second-price auctions. Evolutionarily stable strategies, "Hawk-Dove", replicator dynamics. A continuation of probability theory and linear algebra.
Course program: 33 lessons
Normal-form games
- Normal-form game
- Dominance
- Nash equilibrium
- Pareto and classic games
- Checkpoint: normal-form games
Mixed strategies
- Mixed strategies
- 2×2 mixed equilibrium
- Checkpoint: mixed strategies
Zero-sum games
- Zero-sum games: maximin
- Saddle point and value of the game
- 2×2 mixed solution
- 2×n games: the graphical method
- Checkpoint: zero-sum games
Dynamic games
- Extensive-form games
- Backward induction
- Subgame perfect equilibrium
- Cournot duopoly
- Stackelberg model
- Checkpoint: dynamic games
Repeated games
- Repeated games
- Infinite repetition and discounting
- Checkpoint: repeated games
Cooperative games and auctions
- Coalitions and the characteristic function
- Shapley value
- Core of a cooperative game
- First-price and second-price auctions
- Equilibrium bids in an auction
- Checkpoint: cooperative games and auctions
Evolutionary games
- Evolutionarily stable strategy
- Hawk-Dove
- Replicator dynamics
- Checkpoint: evolutionary games
Final test
- Final test on game theory